“There is nothing on which men are commonly more intent than on making a way for their opinions. Where the ordinary means fail us, we add command, force, fire, and the sword. It is unfortunate to be in such a pass that the best touchstone of truth is the multitude of believers, in a crowd in which the fools so far surpass the wise in number. As if anything were so common as lack of sense! [Cicero.] A fine evidence of sanity is the multitude of the insane! [Saint Augustine.] It is a difficult thing to set one’s judgment against accepted opinions. The first conviction, taken from the subject itself, seizes the simple; from them it spreads to the able, under the authority of the number and antiquity of the testimonies. For my part, in a matter on which I would not believe one, I would not believe a hundred ones. And I do not judge opinions by their years.” (Montaigne, Essays, tr. Frame)

“There is nothing over which men usually strain harder than when giving free run to their opinions: should the regular means be lacking, we support them by commands, force, fire and sword. It is wretched to be reduced to the point where the best touchstone of truth has become the multitude of believers, at a time when the fools in the crowd are so much more numerous than the wise: quasi vero quidquam sit tam valde quam nil sapere vulgare [as though anything whatsoever were more common than lack of wisdom]. Sanitatis patrocinium est, insanientium turba. [A mob of lunatics now form the authority for sane truth.] It is hard to stiffen your judgement against widely held opinions. At first simple folk are convinced by the event itself: it sweeps over them. From them it spreads to the more intelligent folk by the authority of the number and the antiquity of the testimonies. Personally, what I would not believe when one person says it, I would not believe if a hundred times one said it. And I do not judge opinions by their age.” (Montaigne, Essays, tr. Screech)

“There is nothing to which men commonly are more inclined than to make way for their own opinions; where the ordinary means fail us, we add command, force, fire, and sword. ‘Tis a misfortune to be at such a pass, that the best test of truth is the multitude of believers in a crowd, where the number of fools so much exceeds the wise: Quasi vero quidquam sit tam valde, quam nil sapere, vulgare. [As if anything were so common as ignorance. Cicero, De Divin., ii.] Sanitatis patrocinium est, insanientium turba. [The multitude of fools is a protection to the wise. St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, vi. 10.] ‘Tis hard to resolve a man’s judgment against the common opinions: the first persuasion, taken from the very subject itself, possesses the simple, and from them diffuses itself to the wise, under the authority of the number and antiquity of the witnesses. For my part, what I should not believe from one, I should not believe from a hundred and one: and I do not judge opinions by years.” (Montaigne, Essays, tr. Cotton)